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  In a series of articles I have explained the relevance of sociological theory to crime policy. [FN1]  Specifically I
have sought to use a sociological explanation of why certain areas have high crime rates in order to make crime
policy recommendations.  The theory on which I have relied, social disorganization theory, [FN2] postulates that the
structural and cultural organization of neighborhoods can either facilitate or hinder crime occurrence.  By paying
attention to these phenomena, I have argued that the state, through its criminal policy, can usefully harness norms in
order to help residents of high-crime communities help themselves resist and control crime. [FN3]
  *392 Because social organization theory focuses on places and not people, missing from this theory is an
explanation of why individuals decide to break the law in the first place.  Social organization theory focuses on the
infrastructure of relationships in a community (what I have referred to elsewhere as norm highways), [FN4] and it
specifies how ideas, norms, and values that are centered around compliance can be promoted and promulgated. But
social organization theory's explanation of crime persistence in certain areas does not specify the content of the
norms, values, and ideas pertaining to compliance that are facilitated by certain organizational structures.  The
content of the norms of compliance must be supplied elsewhere.
  The purpose of this essay is to supply such a theory.  This essay provides an argument for making the structural
and cultural theories of sociology I have discussed in other work relevant to the individual by providing an
explanation of why individuals comply with the law.  Social psychologists have determined quite persuasively that
the inclination that people have to voluntarily comply with the law is governed much more by norm-based reasons
than by instrumental ones. [FN5]  It logically follows that policies that harness norms, as opposed to those policies
that attempt to achieve compliance by targeting the consequences of failing to obey, will produce useful crime
policy.
  Social psychology drives my argument here, but to make the theory more vivid, I will rely on two metaphors.  I
intend these metaphors to capture contrasting aspects of law enforcement policy that utilizes norms of legitimacy to
produce compliance rather than policy that emphasizes coercion implemented through hierarchical relationships
between government officials and the governed to achieve the same goal.  To illustrate the former mode of law
enforcement policy, I look to the metaphor of "Quakerism," and to illustrate the latter I look to the metaphor of
"Puritanism." As I explain below, these designations are meant to be evocative rather than completely descriptive,
and by using them I do not intend to incorporate the entirety of each religious practice into my discussion of law
enforcement.  Rather, I use these metaphors to capture the structural features of programs that are either more (or
less) consistent with the idea of achieving norm-*393 based voluntary compliance and enhanced social organization
of high-crime communities and not historical fact. Specifically, when I invoke "Quakerism" I mean to emphasize
horizontal relationships between government authorities and individuals as well as trust in authorities to produce
compliance; and when I point to "Puritanism," I am referring to an ethic of criminal policy which emphasizes
hierarchical relationships between government authorities and individuals governed as well as coercion to produce
compliance.
  I will first explain a sociological theory of crime persistence in certain areas in order to make clear the centrality of
norms in the variance of crime rates in certain areas.  Then I will turn to an explanation of a norm- based theory of
why people obey the law.  In this Part I will argue that relationships between law enforcement authorities and the
people matter more than consequences imposed by authorities to produce compliance with the law, in part because
the desire of individuals to comply with the law is powerfully connected to their self-esteem. [FN6]  Next I will
motivate the social psychological theory through the introduction of the metaphors "Quakerism" and "Puritanism."
Through these metaphors I hope to make more vivid the policy implications of the sociological and psychological
theories laid out in Parts one and two.  Part three explains the relevance of these ideas to criminal policy by
providing examples of criminal law policy that draw upon the Quaker ethic.
Norms and Crime Rates (or Norms and Crime Persistence)
  In my work I have focused on formulating crime policy for high crime, minority and poor areas of cities.  One
important question to answer in this work has been: Why do some communities exhibit high crime rates while others
do not?  As an answer, I have looked to social disorganization theory.  This is a theory developed by Clifford Shaw
and Henry McKay to explain why juvenile delinquency remained high in certain areas of central cities over time
despite population turnover.
  In Shaw and McKay's classic work, they maintained that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential
mobility led to the disruption of community social organization, which, in *394 turn, accounted for variation in
crime and delinquency rates in a given area. [FN7]  To support this theory, the researchers demonstrated that high
rates of juvenile delinquency were specific to certain areas in the cities they studied and that these rates persisted
over time despite population turnover.  This finding motivated the researchers to reject individual-level explanations
of delinquency and focus instead on the features of the communities in which the juveniles lived in order to explain
the high crime rates. [FN8]
  Contemporary researchers have applied Shaw and McKay's insights to the longstanding problematic observation
that African-Americans are under criminal justice system control out of proportion to their representation in the
general population. [FN9]  Shaw and McKay's community organization analysis focuses on the community as the
unit of analysis rather than the individual.  This shift in focus accentuates the problems with attempts to explain
criminal involvement on the basis of racial group. [FN10]  Instead, the community- based view emphasizes the
critical nature of contextual assessments of the involvement of different groups in the criminal justice system.
  Such contextual analyses have been spurred by poverty researchers who have documented that major differences
often exist between the ecological contexts in which poor African-Americans typically reside on the one hand, and
those in which poor whites typically reside on the other.  Poor white families tend to reside in communities that
feature more family-stable contexts than poor black families. [FN11]  Indeed, Professors Robert *395 Sampson and
William Julius Wilson have noted, "racial difference in poverty and family disruption are so strong that the 'worst'
urban contexts in which whites reside are considerably better than the average context of black communities."
[FN12]
  In terms of social organization theory, these different contexts translate into different levels of capacity of
neighborhoods to resist and reduce crime. This is in large part because ecological contexts affect the extent to which
neighborhood residents exert social control--informal mechanisms rather than formal regulation imposed by police
and courts--to achieve public order.
  A community's exertion of social control is just another way of referring to how a community enforces norms.
Norm enforcement is easier when individuals in a community have social linkages and trust one another.
Individuals who reside in communities in which there are few social linkages and where distrust is rampant will
have difficulty exerting social control over one another. Empirical work bears this out.  While ecological factors
such as poverty, joblessness and family disruption are associated with crime, criminologists have shown that such
factors are mediated by community-type social capital factors such as prevalence of friendship networks,
participation in formal and informal organizations like churches and PTAs and the like. [FN13]  Such social
structural factors provide the linkages along which norms of law abidingness can travel.  They are "norm highways."
[FN14]
  It is critical to understand, however, that the norms on social highways can travel in any direction.  There is no
necessary reason why community norms must be directed toward the project of crime control.  In fact, one can
easily imagine tight social networks supporting criminogenic conduct on a community- wide basis.  However,
according to Sampson and his colleagues, when neighborhoods with strong social structures also demonstrate the
feature of "collective efficacy," [FN15] then both factors, the structural *396 as well as the cultural norm-based
efficacy notion, work together to reinforce the capacity of a community to control crime. [FN16]
  Because social capital factors appear to matter more to explaining high crime rates in communities than individual-
level factors, it makes sense to engineer crime policy that takes account of this reality.  The social capital thesis calls
into question policies that attempt to control crime simply by manipulating an individual's calculus regarding
whether "crime pays" in the particular instance.  In fact, deterrence-based strategies directed toward individual law
breakers may even exacerbate the very activity the strategy purports to curb. [FN17]  For example, if lawmakers
choose to address illegal drug selling by increasing the number of those convicted for drug selling and by increasing
prison sentences for those convicted of such activity (which is basically the current American approach to drug
crimes), then one expected consequence is that more individuals will be imprisoned for longer periods of time.
Although the standard economic conception of crime suggests that this strategy should make a dent in the level of
illegal drug activity, [FN18] social organization theory's emphasis on social capital and norms suggests that this
strategy will backfire.  The highest numbers of those caught under this approach will tend to be street-level dealers,
who are not evenly distributed throughout a city, but who are geographically concentrated in disadvantaged,
minority neighborhoods. [FN19]  Removal of *397 these individuals in large numbers from their communities will
be associated with higher levels of joblessness, low economic status, and family disruption, which in turn will
disrupt the social structural and cultural determinants of community-based social control. [FN20]
  Norm-based strategies do not depend so much on manipulating the price of formal punishment that illegal drug
sellers see; rather, such strategies emphasize the promotion of changes to social organization structures in
communities that will both limit opportunities for law breakers to engage in illegal conduct and provide incentives
for law abiders to promulgate and pass on values that are inconsistent with law breaking.  The best norm-based
strategies will maximize social organization benefits without visiting as high a cost on disadvantaged communities
as high rates of imprisonment do.  Drug enforcement strategies, such as reverse drug stings, [FN21] redistribute
enforcement costs to communities that have the capacity to absorb the consequences of possible imprisonment.
These, and strategies that attempt to disrupt illegal drug markets without relying at all on imprisonment, such as
using loitering ordinances to make it difficult for drug buyers to find street sellers, [FN22] can address illegal drug
markets without concentrating the costs of imprisonment on the communities least prepared to absorb those costs.
  The strategies just mentioned employ the collective forms of social control that exist, at some level, in every
community.  In places where crime is rampant, private social control is often weak, and government programs can
be used to enhance private social control.  It is critical to see, however, that these strategies work primarily by
changing or addressing the social structure of neighborhoods in some way.  They do not address the actual substance
of the inclination that individuals have (or do not have) to obey the law.  This is because the foundation of these
strategies lies in social organization theory, which provides an explanation *398 of how social structure can generate
particular species of social capital that can be directed toward crime reduction.
  One suspects, however, that if a useful theory of compliance were attached to the social structural theory of crime
reduction, then even more gains for crime control could be achieved.
Norms and Compliance
  Do people obey the law because they fear the consequences if they do not?  Or, do they obey the law for other
reasons?  Focusing on the former question, economists have looked primarily to deterrence theory to explain
compliance. [FN23]  The foundations of this theory are well-known.  People rationally maximize their utility, and
they, therefore, shape their behavior in response to incentives and penalties associated with the criminal code.
[FN24]  This view suggests that compliance is instrumental.  This view also fuels the current trend toward "get
tough on crime" approaches, which feature policies such as truth-in-sentencing, long sentences for drug offending,
and so-called "three-strikes-and-you're-out" sentences.
  Social psychologists have offered another view of compliance with the law.  By pointing to normative bases for
compliance rather than instrumental ones, these researchers have connected voluntary compliance with the law to
the fact that individuals believe the law is "just" or because they believe that the authority enforcing the law has the
right to do so. [FN25]  These factors are considered normative because individuals respond to them differently from
the way they respond to rewards and punishments.  In contrast to the individual who complies with the law because
she is responding to externally imposed punishments, the individual who complies for normative reasons does so
because she feels an internal obligation. [FN26]  It is "[t]he suggestion that citizens will voluntarily act against their
self-interest [that] is the key to the social value of normative influences." [FN27]
  Compliance that flows from one's belief that a law is just is *399 different from compliance that follows a belief
that authorities have the right to dictate proper behavior, even though both of these categories for compliance are
normative.  Psychologist Tom Tyler refers to reasons for compliance situated within the former category as
morality-based, and he calls the latter category of reasons for compliance legitimacy-based. [FN28] Research shows
morality to be the more powerful of the normative reasons for compliance. [FN29]  However, I will focus on
legitimacy for two reasons. First, legitimacy, an amalgamation of perceptions that individuals hold of the law and
authorities that enforce it, is rather uniquely in government control compared to the development of personal
morality.  This is not to say that governmental authorities have no influence over the development of an individual's
morality, [FN30] but, it is clear that the role of government is indirect and that personal morality starts to develop at
an early age when a child spends more time with parents and parent-directed caretakers. [FN31] Moreover, there are
legal constraints on what may be the most effective methods for government to utilize in shaping personal morality
of citizens. [FN32] Second, legitimacy is a more stable basis for voluntary compliance than is personal morality--at
least *400 from the government's perspective.  While greater legitimacy translates into more compliance whether or
not compliance is in the personal interest of an individual, one's personal moral schedule may or may not be in line
with authoritative dictates. [FN33]
  While legitimacy is not as important to compliance as is morality, there is empirical work demonstrating that
legitimacy matters more to compliance than instrumental factors, such as sanctions imposed by authorities on
individuals who fail to follow the law or private rules.  For example, in a study designed to test compliance directly,
Tyler used regression analyses to test the relative impact on the compliance of respondents of legitimacy, public
deterrence, peer disapproval, and personal morality.  He found that the regression estimate for legitimacy on
compliance was about five times greater than the estimate for deterrence. [FN34]  Other studies exploring the
relationship between legitimacy and behavior related to compliance such as acceptance of arbitration awards,
[FN35] and decision acceptance and rule following in business settings [FN36] have found that legitimacy has a
profound impact on behavior.
  *401 Importantly, the argument is not that instrumental means of producing compliance have no effect.  In each of
the studies cited here, deterrence or outcome-based judgement influenced compliance or related behavior in some
way. Still, this work suggests either that legitimacy is typically more important or just as important to compliance as
instrumental reasons are.  This is more good news because relying only on carrots and sticks to produce compliance
can be a costly strategy.  Programs featuring rewards and punishments can be costly because instrumental means of
producing compliance are not self-sustaining. Authorities must be willing to maintain mechanisms of instrumental
compliance. For example, if deterrence is to be produced by maintaining a certain probability of detection of rule-
breakers, then authorities must be willing to devote resources to maintenance (or increase) of the desired level of
police to ensure that the requisite probability of detection is met.  Therefore, instrumental means of producing
compliance always depend on resource limits. Legitimacy as a means of producing compliance, in contrast, does not
always depend on resource limits because legitimacy can be acquired simply by changing procedures and practices
of current officials in ways that require almost no additional resources.  For example, some research indicates that
police who regularly treat arrestees with courtesy are more likely than those who do not to be viewed as legitimate.
[FN37]  While police officers may not like to be told to be more polite to arrestees, this research suggests that law
enforcement gains could be achieved more cheaply than through more instrumental means simply by telling officers
to "be nice."
  Once established, legitimacy can support acceptance of decisions as long as authorities are viewed as legitimate.
We should, therefore, expect greater compliance in communities where police treat arrestees with greater respect
than communities where police do not, even if the former community does not hire any more police officers.
  So far, I have suggested that legitimacy is one of the keys to engendering greater compliance.  I will later argue that
legitimacy is a key substantive norm that must be transmitted along *402 norm-highways in a community to ensure
that a community has the capacity to resist and control crime.  But to this point, an operational definition of
legitimacy is lacking.  What does it mean to say that "authorities have the right to dictate proper behavior?" Social
psychology again provides assistance.
  Researchers in this field have outlined very distinct and crisp models of legitimacy--models that can be empirically
tested and so are more useful to the policymaking enterprise than philosophical notions of what is "right" and "just."
One model defines legitimacy in terms of maximizing self-interest. This work suggests that people will evaluate
authorities as legitimate when authorities make decisions that benefit them in the long run. [FN38]  While the self-
interest approach has been found to have great explanatory power, it has also been found to be incomplete. [FN39]
One limitation of this approach is the extent to which it fails to make sense of the fact that individuals confer
legitimacy on officials even in the face of repeated negative outcomes.  Another limitation is the inability of the self-
interest perspective to account for the fact that people appear to care very deeply about the way they are treated by
authorities quite apart from the outcome of particular encounters.  These limitations suggest that a theory relying on
norms rather than outcomes--specifically, a theory dictating that authorities will be perceived as legitimate as long as
their actions conform to certain norms whether or not decisions are personally favorable to the perceiver, will better
explain real world behavior.
  Psychologists Allan Lind and Tom Tyler have developed a theory of procedural justice that does account for the
regular conference in legitimacy in the face of repeated negative outcomes and the fact that people care a great deal
about how they are treated by governmental authorities. They argue that processes that lead up to an outcome are
important indicators to individuals about how the authority in question views the group to which the evaluator
perceives herself belonging.  This is called the "group value" model to distinguish it from the more instrumental
process control approach. [FN40] Tyler and Lind explain that procedural *403 justice may have a greater impact
than other justice theories of legitimacy because the use of procedures regarded as fair by all parties facilitates the
maintenance of positive relations among group members, preserving the fabric of society, even in the face of the
conflict of interest that exists in any group whose members have different preference structures and different beliefs
concerning how the group should manage its affairs. [FN41]  Putting this point another way, procedures might be
considered more "trait-like" [FN42] than outcomes, which are variable, or which may be extremely indeterminate in
a particular case.  For example, while it may not be obvious how a particular case should come out, it is almost
always clear how parties should proceed and be treated in that particular case.
  The latter point drives the relational view of procedural justice.  Individuals care about how they are treated by
government authorities because treatment provides important indicators to individuals about how the authority in
question views the group to which the individual evaluator perceives herself belonging. [FN43]  In order to make
this assessment, individuals focus on three factors: standing, neutrality and trust. [FN44]  By standing, researchers
are referring to indications that the authority recognizes an individual's status and membership in a valued group,
such as polite treatment and treatment that accords dignity and respect, such as concern for rights. [FN45]
Neutrality refers to indications that decisions in which the perceiver is not made to feel as if she is less worthy *404
than others because of bias, discrimination and incompetence. [FN46]  And trust refers to the extent to which a
perceiver believes that the authority in question will act fairly and benevolently in the future. [FN47] Of course,
individuals making assessments do not disaggregate their assessments in terms of these factors; rather, they come to
conclusions about authorities by considering information that is relevant to these factors.  Researchers have been
able to disaggregate the various factors for purposes of analysis. [FN48]
  It should be clear, then, that a legitimacy-based law enforcement policy will necessarily make relevant those who
are typically considered law breakers, as well as those who are not. A legitimacy-based program of law enforcement
will focus more on persuasion than it will focus on punishment.  And, in order to persuade, authorities will have to
pay attention to the creation of the necessary social capital that engenders trust relationships between governors and
the governed.  Such trust cannot be created simply by emphasizing rewards and punishments, for those strategies
assume that all individuals care about is the "bottom line"--an assumption that is contrary to the group value theory
of procedural justice and much empirical evidence.  In fact, an assumption that compliance is typically created only
by threats of coercion backed up with punishment is fundamentally inconsistent with trust.
Quakers and Puritans [FN49]
  Research in psychology indicates that an individual's willingness to voluntarily comply with the law is connected
to the manner in which governmental authorities treat the individuals.  What matters is whether individuals think
that authorities think that individuals count as manifested in the way that authorities behave.  Thus, the group value
theory of legitimacy predicts that those who are treated politely, with respect, and in an egalitarian fashion will be
more likely to comply with the law than those subject to rules enforced through coercive methods under a
hierarchical*405 structure of relationships between authorities and the governed.
  The importance of egalitarianism and mutuality of respect between government authorities and the governed to the
theory of voluntary compliance considered against the formal punishment emphasis of official crime policy, drives
my choice of "Quakerism" [FN50] and "Puritanism" as metaphorical touchstones to illustrate the features of law
enforcement policy that will best harness the power of norms on the one hand and policies that do not on the other.
By considering both of these religious metaphors I hope to crystallize what might otherwise be an abstract
discussion of psychological and sociological theory.
  I mean the notion of Quakerism to capture the importance of horizontal relationship between government and
citizens to a program of normative law enforcement.  The differences and similarities between Quakers and Puritans
fill volumes of historical research, but one basic difference between the two groups was the Quaker subscription to a
sort of radical equality of relationship among church members. [FN51]  Perhaps the best (and best-known)
illustration of the egalitarian nature of the Quaker religion is in the structure of the Quaker meeting.  Unlike more
typical churches, which were arranged with a raised pulpit in the front and pews before the pulpit, and which
followed a strict liturgy, Quaker meeting houses [FN52] had no pulpit, and chairs on which members sat were
arranged in a circle or in a square so that everyone could see one another.  There was no liturgy.  Instead, members
spoke when they were moved to speak.  Everything about the Quaker meeting emphasized the horizontal
relationship among members. [FN53]
  In contrast, the structure of the Puritan church was much more *406 hierarchical.  The church demanded fidelity to
specially-trained ministers who were to congregations, "as parent and children, shepherd and sheep, rulers and
ruled." [FN54]  Thus, a key feature of Puritanism was the vertical relationship between the church leader and the
congregants, and it was the church leaders who imposed the well-known Puritan discipline. [FN55]
  These popular conceptions of Puritanism and Quakerism operate as metaphors to give meaning and color to
otherwise bland and abstract notions of the centrality of horizontal relationship to normative law enforcement and
vertical relationship to law enforcement that relies on instrumental means to produce compliance.  Substituting law
enforcement agents for church leadership, we can see that enforcement techniques suffused with a "Puritan" ethic
will rely on positional hierarchy to produce compliance.  We can also see how coercion readily fits with hierarchical
authority.  A "Puritan" police officer attempting to establish order among a group of youths in a high crime
neighborhood will likely adopt an attitude of "Obey me because I said so."  If the youths fail to obey, such an officer
will immediately resort to force in the form of an arrest because his authority has been challenged.  In this way, the
Puritan police officer establishes order through hierarchical order supported by coercion.
  The "Quaker" police officer, who achieves order through leverage of mutual respect engendered by horizontal
relationships will not be so quick to rely on force because such coercion is inconsistent with the ethic.  This officer,
when attempting to establish order, will speak to the youths in a way that signals respect, expecting that the youths
will reciprocate.  This officer must be confident that merely because she has asked, the youths will move because
she has given away some of the power that flows from hierarchy.  Such an officer will rely on trust rather than threat
of coercion for assurance of compliance because the maintenance of hierarchy to achieve control through
instrumental means itself conveys a message of distrust.
  The notion of giving away power in a situation in which police *407 confront youth might cause some to think that
the horizontal nature of the Quaker ethic is simply ill-suited to today's policing.  Should not the police officer who
needs to establish order among the youths I have just mentioned be able to use force and arrest the youths if
necessary? Coercion and force and reliance on hierarchical position is simply necessary to maintain control, and to
allow otherwise would lead to anarchy.  Note, however, that the Quaker ethic I have just described does not outlaw
arrest and force.  Rather, it simply suggests that use of that force is not always necessary to maintain order.  Because
of the potential for the constant use of force to undermine perceptions of legitimacy of government authority, such
force should be used sparingly.  An example helps to make the point.  Analysis of interview data of offenders
arrested for domestic violence demonstrates that when police conducted arrests taking time to listen to both the
offender and the victim, as well as not handcuffing the offender in front of the victim or using physical force to
effect the arrest, there was a lower risk of repeat offending. [FN56]  These aspects of the arrest procedure were
associated with procedural fairness in the eyes of the offender, and those arrests exhibiting more procedural fairness
produced offenders with a risk of 25% of repeat offending compared to a 40% for those arrested with lesser indicia
of procedural fairness. [FN57]  The point is that ideally force should not be necessary, but when force (arrest) is
used the arrest itself should be conducted in a way that comports with procedural fairness.
  Note, too, that the Quaker ethic I have just explained does not have to do away with hierarchy altogether.
Authorities that engender trust might expect (and achieve) deference from citizens who might well disagree with
them. [FN58]  However, it is important to see that what I have called the Puritan instrumental means of producing
compliance depends on hierarchy in a way that the Quaker-like approach does not.  In fact, the Quaker ethic holds
out the promise of a meeting of the minds between authorities and citizens that is more remote under the alternative
approach.  Creation of relationships and support of dialogue between authorities *408 and citizens can lead to
governance through consensus. [FN59]  These two processes are by no means mutually exclusive.  As Tyler's work
shows, people think they should obey legitimate authorities, and they think that following rules is the morally right
thing to do. [FN60]  Thus, an approach that encourages individuals to trust governmental authorities, which is likely
to lead to deference, is also likely to lead to greater opportunities for consensus, as trust is built through the
establishment of relationships.
Norm-Based Law Enforcement
  What would law enforcement policy suffused with the Quaker ethic look like?  In this section I will point to
various existing policies that exhibit different aspects of Quakerism in law enforcement.  The examples are meant to
be neither representative nor exhaustive.  Nevertheless, each example holds out great promise for law enforcement
reform.
Restorative Justice
  The recent trend toward greater emphasis on restorative rather than retributive justice in the administration of
juvenile justice exhibits several features of Quakerism.  Restorative justice emphasizes the relationship between the
offender and the victim rather than the relationship between the offender and the state. [FN61]  Scholars of
restorative justice innovations typically key in on the fact that these innovations provide victims of crime with a
more prominent role in the justice process than does the traditional justice system. [FN62]  What makes the
restorative justice innovations Quaker-like has less to do with the victim-centeredness of the *409 process and has
more to do with how the increased participation of victims is achieved.
  While there are several incarnations of restorative justice, family group conferencing is most illustrative of the
argument of this essay.  Typically a juvenile offender is referred by the court to a mediation process after
wrongdoing is admitted.  The mediator determines whether the offender and the victim are willing to meet face-to-
face, and if so, a conference is scheduled. [FN63]  The participants in the conference typically include the young
offender and his or her family and supporters, the victim and his or her family and supporters, a police officer and a
youth advocate. [FN64]  The participants sit in a circle and the discussion proceeds by first having the offender
speak, then the victim, and finally reaching a disposition through consensus. [FN65]  No lawyers are allowed.
  The structure of the conferences themselves clearly implicate the Quaker metaphor.  Sentences are not imposed by
state officials who sit above everyone else and who control the show.  Instead, all of the participants sit on the same
plane facing one another in a facsimile of the radical egalitarian structure of the Quaker meeting.  The state official
who is present (the police officer) is given no special power role.  The officer sits in the circle just as everyone else.
And it is the group together (including the offender), not the state's representative alone, who work out the
disposition.  The participation of offender in her own sentencing is another Quaker feature.  In contrast to the
traditional sentence, which relies on threat of coercion to insure that an offender carries out a sentence (revocation of
probation, for example), restorative justice imposes sentences that the offender herself agrees to and thinks is fair.
  Studies of various restorative justice programs reveal many successes.  There are extremely consistent reports of
victim satisfaction with restorative justice experiences. [FN66]  Offenders have been found to respond to restorative
justice programs because they perceive them as just. [FN67]  Of course, the social psychology reviewed above
provides reason to be hopeful that these perceptions *410 will translate into greater voluntary compliance.  There are
a limited number of studies indicating that restorative justice processing is associated with lower reoffending levels
when participants are compared to those in control groups, but more work must be done to verify this effect. [FN68]
  Of course it is not enough to point to the satisfaction of the offender and the victim to determine success of a
criminal justice innovation.  The theory of social organization reviewed above makes the larger community central
to the enterprise of crime resistance and reduction, and the theories of legitimacy also reviewed here depend on
social capital as well.  There appear to be advantages in this regard from pursuing restorative justice, as there is
some evidence of "microcommunity building," [FN69] the creation of social bonds that facilitate social organization
and a resulting transmission of norms conducive to social control.
  Clearly more research must be done to verify these effects, but the research thus far is promising.  Moreover, there
are few areas of social policy that are in greater need for reform than juvenile justice.
Community Participation in Policing
  Generation of participation by stakeholders in criminal justice processes is a feature of Quaker-like law
enforcement that should enhance legitimacy of government.  The previous section explained a method of creating
more participation of relevant actors in sentencing of juveniles.  A key aspect of creating participation was the
leveling of authority between government officials and the governed.  This section features another law enforcement
process that invites greater participation of community members in the policing process.  Like restorative justice, the
process described requires government officials to cede some of their exclusive power to enforce laws.
  In an attempt to address the complaints of residents concerned about gang violence and open-air drug selling, the
City of Chicago has recently adopted an ordinance that empowers police officers to approach groups of people
involved in gang loitering or narcotics-related loitering, inform those individuals that they are engaged in prohibited
loitering, order the individuals to disperse *411 from within sight and hearing of the place which the order was
issued, and inform the individuals ordered to disperse that they will be subject to arrest if they fail to obey the order
or return to the area during the next three hours. [FN70]  This ordinance is a revised version of another anti- gang
loitering ordinance adopted by Chicago. [FN71]  The original ordinance was struck down by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutionally vague. [FN72] While the original ordinance defined loitering as staying in one place "with no
apparent purpose," [FN73] the revised ordinance defines gang loitering as "remaining in any one place under
circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is to
enable a criminal street gang to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those
areas, or to conceal illegal activities." [FN74]  Similarly, narcotics-related loitering means "remaining in any one
place under circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of that
behavior is to facilitate the distribution of substances in violation of the Cannabis Control Act or the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act." [FN75]  The definitions of both types of loitering incorporate specific language from
both Justice Stevens' opinion for the plurality and Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which was joined by Justice
Breyer.
  While the original anti-gang loitering ordinance was designed in a way that should have enhanced the social
organization of communities with compromised ability to engage in suppression of crime, [FN76] the revised
ordinance contains language that has both social organization benefits and legitimacy benefits.  Consider social
organization first.  The sociology explained above suggests that law enforcement strategies that depend on
imprisonment of a large number of geographically concentrated individuals should be avoided if possible.  Of
course, some criminal offenses demand imprisonment, such as murder or robbery.  But other offenses likely are
better dealt with through norm-focused strategies.  Open-air drug selling is an example.  The anti-gang, *412 anti-
narcotics loitering ordinance adopted by Chicago empowers police officers to disrupt drug markets without arresting
large numbers of low-level dealers who retail in open areas and who are concentrated in minority, poor areas of the
City.  These dealers depend on confederates to stand in strategic areas to advertise the drugs they are selling to the
many buyers who come from outside the particular community in which the drugs are sold--often the suburbs.
Without the "advertisers" these outsiders cannot find the dealers.  So, enforcement of the anti-narcotics provision of
the ordinance can disrupt the market without arrest and potential subsequent conviction and imprisonment of the
dealer.  This is a social organization benefit.  Additionally, the original ordinance invalidated by the Supreme Court
also possessed the benefit of disruption of drug markets without relying on imprisonment of geographically
concentrated drug dealers, another social organization benefit.
  The new ordinance is extremely innovative in the way in which enforcement areas are designated.  The designation
process should enhance the legitimacy of the ordinance's enforcement according to social psychological theory.
Unlike an ordinance prohibiting disorderly conduct, police officers are not allowed to enforce this ordinance
anywhere and at any time.  The City Council recognized that drug selling and gang clashes are intimately bound up
in place. Therefore, the ordinance provides that the Superintendent of Police shall designate areas of the city for
enforcement by written directive. [FN77]  In order to make this designation, the ordinance also provides that the
Superintendent "shall consult as he or she deems appropriate with persons who are knowledgeable . . . .  Such
persons may include . . . elected and appointed officials of the area; community-based organizations; and
participants in the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) who are familiar with the area." [FN78]  Because
of the controversy surrounding the original ordinance, it is clear that there is no question that the Superintendent will
deem it appropriate to consult with community groups; the real issue is how that consultation will be carried out.
[FN79]
  The consultation provision provides a key opening for increased *413 perceptions of legitimacy of Chicago police
among the communities in which this ordinance will be enforced.  By its very structure the ordinance reduces the
hierarchy inherent to municipal policing.  This ordinance creates a partnership in the law enforcement process, and
through that process creates greater accountability of the police to the members of affected communities.  The
structure I have described helps to create accountability in another way.  By involving the city's alderman in the
designation process, a circle of guardianship is produced that generates trust.  Thus, participants who are already
active in the CAPS process may be actively involved in the designation process, while other groups may be less
involved--perhaps because they distrust the police more than CAPS participants.  But the less trustful groups may
well complain to their alderman, [FN80] who can convey their wishes to the relevant police officer.  The end result
will hopefully be a compromise that everyone can live with, even if not everyone is happy with it.  Social
psychology tells us, however, that it is the process of achieving the outcome, more than the outcome itself that really
matters, and this process provides both invitations to participation as well as meaningful signals to community
members that their opinions count.
Cooperation Between the Church and the Police
  There have been in the last few years an increasing number of reports of cooperation between leaders of Black
churches and local law enforcement agents.  Probably the best known leader engaged in this effort is the Reverend
Eugene Rivers of Boston, who through his Ten Point Coalition, has been credited as being one of the most important
reasons behind Boston's stunning success in curbing the number of youths murdered by guns. [FN81]
  Rivers is not the only African-American pastor to engage in cooperative efforts with the police.  There has been an
ongoing effort in Chicago to create more ties between the pastors of African-American churches on Chicago's
impoverished West side and the police.  To create these bonds the commander of Chicago's highest-crime Police
District tried an extremely innovative strategy.  Three years ago, he facilitated a community-wide *414 prayer vigil.
In groups of ten, the participants stood on designated corners--the same corners where lookouts often hawked their
wares by calling out, "Rocks and Blows!"--and prayed.  Following the prayer vigil, the whole group and over 7,000
more community residents went to a large park for a "praise celebration," where there was music provided by a 400-
member gospel choir, food, and inspirational speeches.
  Importantly, it is not the vigil itself that creates the legitimacy benefits; rather, it is the organization process-the
monthly meetings in the police roll call room and regular contact between ministers and police officials--that
generated the social capital that drives assessments of trust.  Of course, there would have been no meetings but for
the prayer vigil, so the vigil is a necessary component.  What I want to emphasize is that one cannot evaluate the
benefits of the vigil from a before and after perspective.  That approach would ignore completely the group value
thesis of legitimacy.  This tells us that the process of putting on the vigil was an opportunity for both the police and
the ministers to begin to see themselves as part of the same group--a necessary component to trust generation.
Conclusion
  Social organization theory makes clear the critical connection between effective law enforcement and improvement
of a community's capacity for social control.  The theory highlights the importance of informal, rather than formal,
social control through norms.  But, the theory does not provide an account of how to generate the kinds of norms
that facilitate law-abiding behavior.  The social psychology of justice explained here provides such an account.  I
have tried to demonstrate its potential value through illustrative programs.  The examples are small, but each is
grounded in theory with great promise for law enforcement reform.
  Our current approach to crime control is basically inconsistent with the project of improving community capacity
for social control--especially the capacity of those communities that possess the highest crime rates.  The United
States imprisons more people than any other country in the world, and the bulk of those imprisoned are African-
American males, who likely come from *415 urban areas. [FN82]  Social organization theory tells us that this
approach is dangerously counterproductive.
  Here I have tried to map out a new direction for policy.  The map is not extremely detailed, but there is enough
information to provide the foundations for a new approach.  I hope that what is here is persuasive enough to
convince policy makers to take a new road to crime control.
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